

# Monitoring Demilitarised Zones in the Age of Uncrewed and AI Systems: Lessons from the Korean DMZ

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## Introduction

Demilitarised zones (DMZs) have demonstrated their utility in post-war peace processes. They separate forces, mitigating the risk of deliberate aggression or accidental incidents alike. However, the effective monitoring of DMZs can be challenging, because they tend to cover wide areas, sometimes with dangerous terrain replete with human-made and natural hazards. As such, parties responsible for monitoring DMZs rely on a passive posture where they simply respond to reported incidents, an active posture using personnel or technology wherever resources and the terrain will allow, or a combination of the two. With continued advances in uncrewed systems and artificial intelligence (AI), there are now ever-increasing calls for the employment of these technologies in DMZ monitoring functions.

This is true of the Korean DMZ, a 240 km-long, 4 km-wide swathe of land that bifurcates the Korean Peninsula between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (or North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (or South Korea). In this area, the South Korean government is seeking to enhance its monitoring capabilities by using uncrewed and AI-based systems.

In theory, there are many benefits to this approach, but in practice, policymakers and practitioners must address five inter-related dilemmas to ensure that these technologies actually support peace implementation instead of contributing to unintended conflict and tension. The problems associated with these dilemmas are not insurmountable, but they require deliberate steps and conscious implementation to maximise the opportunities that modern technologies provide while mitigating their risks. The lessons from the Korean DMZ are applicable in any post-war demilitarized zone, including the one envisioned between Russia and Ukraine.

This Policy Brief proceeds as follows. It first outlines the function of DMZs in post-war environments and the practical challenges associated with monitoring them. It then examines the potential advantages that uncrewed and AI-enabled systems offer in addressing these challenges. Next, it assesses the implications of five inter-related policy dilemmas – legal, moral, technological, practical, and security – that arise from introducing such systems into DMZ contexts. This analytical framework is then applied to the Korean DMZ as a contemporary case study. Finally, policy recommendations are advanced aimed at ensuring that the use of emerging technologies strengthens, rather than undermines, peace implementation and long-term stability in DMZs.

## Security challenges

A core task in effective peacebuilding is preserving the cessation of hostilities, and DMZs are an important tool for addressing the security challenges inherent to this responsibility.<sup>1</sup> DMZs are designated buffer zones established to separate armed forces, with the intended effect of mitigating the risk of incidents, whether deliberate or accidental. In terms of the potential for armed aggression, a DMZ ensures that a former party to a conflict is unable to mass forces along boundary areas in preparation for renewed incursions or attacks. In terms of accidents, proximity and contact create opportunities for incidents, whether intended or not. By separating forces, DMZs reduce contact between potential combatants while also reducing the risk that something as simple as the unplanned firing of a weapon or weapons could result in harm to the opposing side.<sup>2</sup>

DMZs typically extend from administrative boundary lines, although they could be designated for preventing attacks in specific locations (e.g. neutral ground designated for dialogue or a nuclear power plant).<sup>3</sup> In the context of post-war environments, the DMZ will likely follow the battle line (sometimes referred to as the line of contact) between the opposing sides. This boundary line, whether agreed upon or de facto, is unlikely to have markers or fences extending along it, which contributes to the need for a buffer zone because of the likelihood of contested interpretations of the boundary's location until formal demarcation occurs.

Activities in DMZs may vary depending on the agreement or agreements between the former conflict parties. In principle, they are meant to be devoid of military forces. However, agreements may be in place for limited numbers of uniformed personnel to operate in a policing capacity. Conversely, DMZs may prohibit either former belligerent party's military forces from entering the buffer zone, allowing only for third-party peace implementers to police the area, such as in the United Nations (UN) Buffer Zone in Cyprus.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> PPI (Parley Policy Initiative) (2023) "The six fundamental steps in peacebuilding", 13 May, <https://www.parleypolicy.com/post/the-six-fundamental-tasks-in-peacebuilding>.

<sup>2</sup> An unplanned firing incident threatened to undo the 27 December 2025 ceasefire agreement between Thailand and Cambodia. On 6 January 2026, a Thai soldier was injured by an explosion that Cambodia reported to be the result of the negligent discharge of a weapon; see Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2026) "Statement on Cambodian forces firing into Chong Bok area, Nam Yuen District, Ubon Ratchathani Province", 6 January, <https://www.mfa.go.th/en/content/statement-th-cam-border-situ-060126-en>.

<sup>3</sup> For example, Ukraine and the International Atomic and Energy Agency (IAEA) have repeatedly called for the establishment of a DMZ at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant; see IAEA (2022) "IAEA proposal for Ukraine nuclear safety and security protection zone wins support as talks begin on its establishment", 22 September, <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/iaea-proposal-for-ukraine-nuclear-safety-and-security-protection-zone-wins-support-as-talks-begin-on-its-establishment>.

<sup>4</sup> Details on monitoring and rulesets for the UN Buffer Zone are codified in the 1989 aide-mémoire.

Both scholarly and practitioner analysis confirm the utility of DMZs. Academic research has shown that the implementation of DMZs in post-war environments can reduce the risk of renewed hostilities by 90%.<sup>5</sup> They have also been identified as a key component of durable peace processes.<sup>6</sup> Meanwhile, practitioners continue to advocate for the employment of DMZs as a military confidence-building measure,<sup>7</sup> and they are a normalised practice under international humanitarian law.<sup>8</sup>

## Challenges associated with monitoring DMZs

For all of their benefits, DMZs come with myriad challenges in the implementation phase, particularly in terms of monitoring functions. These may be broken down into five categories: size, scarcity of resources, natural hazards, humanmade hazards, and the risk of incidents.

The sheer *size* of many DMZs contributes to this monitoring difficulty, because some may cover hundreds of km<sup>2</sup>.

The second challenge is *scarcity of resources*. This may result from a lack of the personnel, vehicles, equipment, or supplies required for a DMZ monitoring mission. It could also stem from an inability to sustain the mission, meaning that the monitors are able to initiate their role, but are unable to carry it out in the longer term. DMZ monitoring is a 24/7/365 mission, and it can be difficult to assign, train, and equip sufficient numbers of personnel for this task.

Further, *natural hazards* may be present that adversely affect monitoring activities. Infrastructure may be inadequate for travelling by vehicle, and there may be risk of floods, landslides, or other natural disasters if no adequate land-management programmes are in place.

Then there are *humanmade hazards*, typically in the form of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). While the Ottawa Convention bans the use of antipersonnel landmines, they are still common weapons of war, constituting persistent threats in the post-war period. The same applies to UXO that may have landed in DMZ areas. When combined with natural occurrences like heavy rains, mine migration becomes possible, meaning that even if monitors or the former conflict parties are aware of and can identify mined areas, some mines may be carried into new positions, becoming a significant hazard.

There is also the persistent *risk of incidents* involving military personnel of the former conflict parties. One party may view the opposing party's activities in the

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<sup>5</sup> V. Fortna (2005) "Scraps of paper? Agreements and the durability of peace", *International Organization*, 57(2): 337-372.

<sup>6</sup> E. Hoffman and J. Bercovitch (2011) "Examining structural components of peace agreements and their durability", *Conflict Resolution Quarterly*, 28(4): 399-426.

<sup>7</sup> UNODA (UN Office of Disarmament Affairs) (n.d.) "Military confidence building measures", accessed 9 January 2026, <https://disarmament.unoda.org/en/our-work/cross-cutting-issues/military-confidence-building-measures>.

<sup>8</sup> ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) (n.d.) "Practice relating to Rule 36. Demilitarized zones", accessed 9 January 2026, <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v2/rule36>.

DMZ as a direct threat and decide to employ militarised responses. This may then trigger escalation cycles that threaten the ceasefire or other agreements reached between the former conflict parties.

## Opportunities offered by uncrewed and AI systems

Several of the challenges associated with DMZ monitoring are surmountable through the employment of uncrewed systems and AI technologies. Uncrewed aerial systems can fly above natural and humanmade hazards while providing birds-eye-view monitoring. They can also cover wider areas in less time than land-based monitors, addressing the potential obstacle of DMZ size. These aerial assets can be supplemented by uncrewed ground systems, particularly when dense foliage obscures aerial surveillance.

AI-driven systems can provide monitoring and reporting when humans are either unavailable or accomplishing other tasks. For example, rather than having people observing surveillance camera footage, an AI-enabled system can scan for personnel, vehicles, or unusual activity, which can prompt reports to a central operations centre where follow-on decision-making about responses can take place.

These systems can enable an increased separation of military personnel. Supplanting on-the-ground human DMZ monitoring with uncrewed systems allows the DMZ to become a true buffer zone between the two sides, reducing the risk of confrontation and potential loss of life that could fuel unnecessary tension and conflict.

Making this all the more appealing is the cost savings that can come from using these systems. Rather than training, equipping, and bedding down personnel across multiple areas along the DMZ, operational hubs can be established that control the uncrewed and AI-enabled surveillance systems throughout the buffer zone. This offers significant cost savings, while freeing up resources for use in other missions.

## Policy implications

While the logic behind the employment of uncrewed and AI systems is sound, policymakers and practitioners must understand and address five substantial policy dilemmas prior to the implementation of DMZ monitoring activities. These include legal, moral, technological, practical, and security dilemmas.

The *legal dilemma* can originate in the terms of the peace-related agreements between the conflict parties. When they agree to establish DMZs, conflict parties invariably establish some form of rules for the management of the buffer zone. These may include rules covering the personnel allowed to enter the DMZ; the type of equipment and armaments that may be employed in the DMZ; and the

rights, duties, and obligations associated with monitoring the zone.<sup>9</sup> Unless the agreements specifically call for a negative list<sup>10</sup> interpretation of these rules, a conflict party may perceive any activity outside of the agreed provisions as a violation. These violations may lead to political moves to suspend or abrogate the terms of an agreement.<sup>11</sup> And unless specific provisions are included in any agreement related to the use of uncrewed systems during DMZ monitoring, there is increased risk of unwanted escalation inside the buffer zone.

The *moral dilemma* is applicable to the employment of autonomous and AI-based systems, particularly in terms of discrimination and targeting distinction. Presumably, these systems would be able to distinguish between military and civilians, as well as authorised and unauthorised activity inside the DMZ. However, studies have already identified AI's discrimination-related problems.<sup>12</sup> The stakes are high here, because misidentification and – most importantly – the misinterpretation of actions and intentions could lead to militarised responses from conflict parties.

A second moral dilemma is created by the potential for the use of force, which is more than just an issue of responses involving inappropriate policing actions. The debate over whether there must be a “human in the loop” between target acquisition and the employment of deadly force is a long-standing and ongoing one,<sup>13</sup> and is germane to the issue of DMZ monitoring. The attraction of cheap and extensive automation becomes an issue when lives and, indeed, the entire peacebuilding process are at stake.

A *technological dilemma* stems from employing uncrewed and AI-based systems for the niche requirements associated with DMZ monitoring. What is necessary to ensure the implementation of peace-related agreements in a DMZ is essentially different from what is needed to execute wartime surveillance missions or to eliminate combat targets on a battlefield. This means that using these systems is not as simple as taking any military system and employing it

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<sup>9</sup> See, for example, Treaty of Peace between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel, with annexes, maps, and agreed minutes, United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS), Vol. 1136, No. 17813 (signed Washington, DC, 26 March 1979; registered 15 May 1979), <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201136/volume-1136-i-17813-english.pdf>.

<sup>10</sup> A “negative list” interpretation of rules means that unless there are provisions against a certain action, it is allowed. A “positive list” interpretation means that unless it is specifically provided for in the rules, an action is not allowed.

<sup>11</sup> An operative example of how quickly perceived violations can lead to the suspension of peace agreements occurred between Thailand and Cambodia in November 2025, when there was a mine-strike incident in boundary areas. The Thai government suspended its obligations under the Kuala Lumpur Peace Accord on the same day that it claimed a Cambodian violation.

<sup>12</sup> See, for example, S. Scott-Hayward (2022) “Securing AI-based security systems”, Strategic Security Analysis No. 25, GCSP, June, <https://www.gcsp.ch/sites/default/files/2024-12/ssa-2022-issue25.pdf>; and F. Mantellassi (2022) “In focus: The challenges of artificial intelligence”, In Focus, GCSP, 4 April, <https://www.gcsp.ch/news/focus-challenges-artificial-intelligence>.

<sup>13</sup> ICRC (2014) *Expert Meeting: Autonomous Weapon Systems: Technical, Military, Legal and Humanitarian Aspects: Geneva, Switzerland, 26-28 March 2014*, Geneva, November, [https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/document/file\\_list/4221-002-autonomous-weapons-systems-full-report.pdf](https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/document/file_list/4221-002-autonomous-weapons-systems-full-report.pdf).

in a DMZ. Conversely, no commercial assets are available that are designed to operate successfully in the types of areas that DMZs occupy. The uniqueness of peace monitoring in DMZs makes it difficult to find the correct systems for the job.

Even after working through the first three dilemmas, many *practical issues* are associated with the employment of uncrewed and AI-based systems. The list of these issues is long and varied, depending on the system. For uncrewed aerial and ground systems, there is the risk of accidental boundary crossings due to lost-link scenarios.<sup>14</sup> For uncrewed weapons stations, there is the risk of unplanned discharges and runaway guns.<sup>15</sup> Maintenance and servicing are required for any systems positioned in DMZs, while system updates and bug fixes are required for all software-based systems. This list is by no means exhaustive, and issues remain regarding the training of operators and troubleshooting when problems invariably arise. Policymakers focused on the benefits of uncrewed and AI-based systems often do not thoroughly assess the practical challenges of their use.

Finally, there is the *security dilemma*. Opposing sides' militaries will tend to distrust each other, particularly former parties to conflict and those with enduring rivalries.<sup>16</sup> In their eyes, there is greater risk in complacency than in mistakenly assuming nefarious intent by the opposing side, so they often have a pessimistic view of the opposing side's actions. This contributes to the action-reaction dynamic in which one party will feel compelled to introduce its own systems – often at greater levels – to avoid mismatches in capabilities, which in turn prompts the other side to do the same. This dynamic applies to the introduction of uncrewed or AI-based systems into DMZs.

The security dilemma also increases the risk of misinterpretation or miscalculation that could fuel conflict escalation. This contributes to heightened alert levels and increased demands for patrols, surveillance, and potential deterrence activities in an area that is supposed to be devoid of military operations. The result of all this is reduced net security, which means that both sides end up worse off than if no additional uncrewed or AI-based systems were introduced in the first place.

For policies for the use of uncrewed and AI-based systems in DMZs to be successful, each of these dilemmas must be addressed through deliberate decision-making and coordination efforts. Failure to do so could lead to substantial flaws in the monitoring process – or, worse still – could inadvertently contribute to escalation cycles between the former parties to a conflict.

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<sup>14</sup> A lost-link situation occurs when an uncrewed system loses communication with its operator and functions without any updates of or corrections to its last known commands.

<sup>15</sup> A runaway gun situation occurs when a weapon continues to fire ammunition even after the trigger is released. The only way to stop a runaway gun is for the weapon to exhaust its ammunition or a person to break the supply of ammunition being fed into it.

<sup>16</sup> D.M. Gibler and P.F. Diehl (1998) “Theoretical and empirical advances in the study of rivalry”, *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 16(2), <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894298016002>.

## Case study: the Korean Demilitarised Zone

The DMZ that bifurcates the Korean Peninsula offers a real-world example of these policy implications. With the presence of rugged mountains, dense forests, and an estimated two million mines and UXO, monitoring activity in the DMZ has necessitated the forward deployment of military forces, with support from thousands of cameras across the buffer zone. But South Korea's population decline has driven down the country's military end-strength<sup>17</sup> and forced the government to consider other options for DMZ monitoring.

Codified in its Defense Innovation series of policy plans, the South Korean government has identified a three-phased process for modernising DMZ monitoring using uncrewed and AI-based systems.<sup>18</sup> In the first phase, the country's military intends to introduce uncrewed aerial systems, uncrewed ground systems, and remotely controlled weapons stations into the DMZ alongside the personnel already deployed. For aerial systems, the South Korean military is exploring the employment of armed omnicopters, while for ground systems it will use a combination of quadrupedal "robodogs" and six-wheeled multiconfiguration vehicles. In terms of remotely controlled weapons stations, the South Korean military has already introduced KR-4 40 mm grenade launchers and KR-6 0.50 calibre heavy machine guns. It has also started to employ AI-based recognition software for the cameras installed across the DMZ. The purpose of these systems is to support surveillance, transport, and policing activities.

The second phase of the plan aims to reduce the number of personnel inside the DMZ and have them monitor it from a rear area hub. These operators would maintain positive responsibility for controlling uncrewed systems and overseeing AI-based surveillance and reporting inside the DMZ. The third phase of the plan aims to remove the humans from the process. In other words, systems would operate autonomously, with personnel only stepping in to address incidents or problems. But however well-developed the plan may be, it does not directly address the five dilemmas discussed above.

The South Korean government has not discussed the employment of drones for DMZ monitoring with its North Korean counterparts. In fact, the only time the two sides have discussed drone employment in and around the DMZ was in 2018, when they negotiated the inter-Korean military agreement.<sup>19</sup> In this

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<sup>17</sup> B. Eun-ji (2025) "Armed forces down to about 450,000 due to low birthrate", *Korea Times*, 10-11 August, <https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/southkorea/defense/20250810/armed-forces-down-to-about-450000-due-to-low-birthrate>.

<sup>18</sup> The most recent version is Defense Innovation 4.0: see Ministry of National Defense, South Korea (2022) "[Defense Innovation 4.0] Redesigning and Reforming the Entire Field of Defense with AI and Advanced Science and Technology", 11 August, [https://www.mnd.go.kr/user/boardList.action?command=view&page=1&boardId=O\\_47261&boardSeq=O\\_306740&siteId=mnndEN](https://www.mnd.go.kr/user/boardList.action?command=view&page=1&boardId=O_47261&boardSeq=O_306740&siteId=mnndEN).

<sup>19</sup> Also referred to as the Comprehensive Military Agreement, or its full name, Agreement on Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain.

agreement, the two parties decided to establish a no-fly zone that included prohibitions on the use of drones within 10 km of the Military Demarcation Line (the land-based boundary line) in the western half of the peninsula and within 15 km in the eastern half of the line. The Defense Innovation-series plans did not align with these obligations, and while both sides have since abandoned the 2018 agreement, the long-standing 1953 Armistice Agreement offers no provisions for the use of uncrewed systems inside the DMZ.

Further complicating the issue of uncrewed systems are the several drone incidents that have proved to be sources of tension between the two sides. In 2014, 2017, and 2022, North Korea flew drones into South Korea-controlled airspace, the lattermost incident of which led to South Korea's retaliatory drone incursions into North Korea-controlled airspace.<sup>20</sup> Then, in October 2024, the South Korean government sent drones (possibly over the DMZ) to drop leaflets on Pyongyang, and in January 2026, the North Korean government denounced the South for flying at least two more drones into North Korean airspace.<sup>21</sup> There is therefore already a basis for mistrust related to the employment of drones that remains unresolved.

Another significant challenge for AI-based and autonomous systems is ambiguous activity that may happen in the DMZ. One example is the intermittent defections that occur across the DMZ, which happen often enough to require systems that are configured to respond effectively to these situations. There are also circumstances where North Korean soldiers conduct labour activities in the DMZ, in terms of which axes and other tools can look similar to small arms on camera footage, particularly thermal imaging. It is absolutely essential that systems neither misidentify these individuals as nefarious actors nor apply inappropriate protocols in response.

Then there are the demonstrated issues affecting remotely controlled weapons stations. So far, the only problems that have occurred is with a misfire, i.e., the South Korean military attempted to fire the weapon but failed to do so.<sup>22</sup> However, this highlights the possibility of mechanical failures, which, if they result in an unplanned discharge and/or runaway gun, could have catastrophic consequences.

Complicating matters still further is the fact that the drive to employ new systems is outpacing adequate preparedness for doing so. There is political impetus to demonstrate the use of systems inside the DMZ as quickly as

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<sup>20</sup> S. Reddy (2023) "UN Command says both Koreas violated armistice with drone intrusions", NK News, 26 January, <https://www.kcnawatch.org/newstream/1768011033-974050309/statement-of-spokesman-for-general-staff-of-korean-peoples-army/>.

<sup>21</sup> KCNA Watch (2026) "Statement of spokesman for General Staff of Korean People's Army", 10 January, <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1768011033-974050309/statement-of-spokesman-for-general-staff-of-korean-peoples-army/>.

<sup>22</sup> This happened in the exchange-of-fire incident that occurred in the DMZ on 3 May 2020; see *Korea Herald* (2020) "Military vows thorough arms inspection after gun malfunctioning at border guard posts", 15 May, <https://www.koreaherald.com/article/2310913>.

possible as the government seeks to address social and structural limitations through the use of technology. This contributes to insufficient training and field testing prior to these systems' deployment inside the DMZ, which can exacerbate practical issues during implementation.

## Policy recommendations

The associated issues that have emerged in attempts to employ uncrewed and AI-based systems in DMZ monitoring on the Korean peninsula have highlighted several lessons for both policymakers and practitioners. These lessons inform five recommendations that are universally applicable and address the five dilemmas.

### **1. Codify the use of uncrewed and AI-enabled systems in DMZ-related agreements before deployment.**

Any introduction of uncrewed or AI-enabled systems into a DMZ should be explicitly authorised in the relevant armistice, ceasefire, or peace implementation agreements. This includes defining which systems may be used, their permitted functions, their areas of operation, and the modalities for oversight and compliance. Ambiguity invites divergent interpretations and increases the risk that technological deployment will be perceived as a violation rather than a stabilising measure. Where agreements already exist, parties should use established review mechanisms to update provisions rather than relying on unilateral interpretations.

### **2. Maintain meaningful human control over all systems capable of using force.**

To address the moral and escalation risks associated with automation, any system with the capacity to employ force in a DMZ must operate with a human in the decision loop. Autonomous operation may be acceptable for fixed, non-kinetic surveillance functions, but mobile or armed systems should remain under direct human control. This preserves accountability, reduces the risk of misidentification, and helps to ensure that responses to ambiguous situations such as defections or non-military activities are proportionate and contextually informed.

### **3. Procure systems specifically designed for peace monitoring, not for combat operations.**

Technologies developed for battlefield surveillance or combat optimisation are poorly suited to the political and operational sensitivities of DMZs. Entities responsible for DMZ monitoring should identify mission-specific requirements such as persistence, reliability, restraint, and transparency, and acquire systems accordingly. This may require bespoke development or modification rather than repurposing existing military platforms, but it reduces the likelihood that monitoring tools themselves become sources of instability.

#### **4. Invest in training, maintenance, and balanced human-machine integration.**

The effectiveness of uncrewed and AI-enabled systems depends on the competence of the personnel who operate, supervise, and maintain them. Adequate training, resourcing, and maintenance planning must be in place before deployment. Monitoring architectures should balance automation with human judgement, ensuring that technology supplements rather than replaces situational awareness and operational decision-making. Over-reliance on systems in the absence of robust procedures increases operational risk and undermines confidence in the monitoring regime.

#### **5. Mitigate the security dilemma through clarity, consistency, and transparency.**

To prevent action-reaction dynamics, parties responsible for DMZ monitoring should clearly communicate which systems are being used, for what purposes, and under what constraints. Employment patterns should be consistent and predictable, and information-sharing mechanisms – whether bilateral or involving third parties – should be used to reduce suspicion. Transparency does not require revealing sensitive technical details, but does require openness in how the technology is being employed for stabilising rather than aggressive effects.

## **Conclusion**

The lessons drawn from the Korean DMZ are directly applicable to other current and prospective DMZs, including a potential future DMZ between Russia and Ukraine. In such contexts, the political sensitivity of buffer zones, the persistence of mutual distrust, and the presence of extensive mines and UXO will create strong incentives to rely on uncrewed and AI-enabled monitoring systems. However, without prior agreement, meaningful human control, and transparency, these technologies could inadvertently increase the risk of incidents and tension. In a Russia-Ukraine scenario, where verification and compliance would be central to any ceasefire or armistice, uncrewed systems could play a valuable role in monitoring force separation, but only if their use is jointly codified, carefully constrained, and embedded within a broader confidence-building architecture involving third-party oversight. The Korean experience demonstrates that technological sophistication alone cannot stabilise a DMZ; rather, deliberate steps that address inherent dilemmas in the peacebuilding process remain essential.

# Building Peace Together

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