The OSCE’s potential in rebuilding the European security order

This article was originally published in German on Stratos.

Abstract

Switzerland will assume the chairmanship of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 2026. How can we bring this organisation back into the spotlight of political decision-makers in the European security area?

An OSCE attention deficit

As we in the Swiss OSCE team prepared for the chairmanship in 2014, we were preoccupied with one key question: how could we bring this organization back into the spotlight of political decision-makers in the European security arena? It was clear to us that the organization's significant potential as a platform for dialogue and cooperation could only be exploited and its instruments applied in conflict management if the OSCE reappeared on the political radar of the relevant capitals. We had a number of ideas on this, but we were realistic enough to know that even as the OSCE Chair, we would not be setting the security policy agenda in the European security space – that is up to the OSCE participating states. We were then presented with a twist of fate: what we called at the time “the crisis in and around Ukraine” solved the attention problem at a single blow. When the OSCE was called upon to act as crisis manager at the end of February 2014, it was back on the radar of decision-makers. Not least thanks to the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, the OSCE's central crisis management and de-escalation instrument, it remained so for quite some time. The renewed attention paid to the organization by relevant security policy actors brought important initiatives in the political-military field back to the OSCE. These included the Structured Dialogue launched by the German Chairmanship at the end of 2016, which sought to revive dialogue on military risk reduction and, ultimately, conventional arms control in a tense period.

Overcoming deep divisions

However, even back then, engaging with Russia did not meet with unanimous support in Europe. Since Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, the willingness of many European countries to engage in dialogue with Moscow has fallen to an all-time low. Instead of direct negotiations with Russia, they prefer to influence Washington's stance toward Moscow in order to dampen its willingness to compromise. This is because the prevailing view at present is that security in and for Europe can no longer be organized with, but only against Russia and its allies. This calls into question the OSCE's basic concept of providing a platform for inclusive security dialogue and a cooperative security order in Europe. At the same time, mistrust is growing in Europe that the United States may no longer be credible in its alliance commitments. Against this backdrop, there is a danger that a European fortress mentality will develop under the banner of “European strategic autonomy.” 

This makes it all the more difficult today to overcome the divisive rift of mistrust and fears of threat on both sides in order to restore inclusive dialogue within the OSCE. In view of the dangers of war spreading or even nuclear escalation, the lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis must be re-anchored in political consciousness. Security based solely on deterrence is unstable because it is based on worst-case scenarios, tends toward alarmist misjudgments, promotes an arms race, and ultimately leads to permanent political crises with the constant threat of escalation. As the 1967 Harmel Report of NATO rightly stated, deterrence must therefore be cushioned by stabilizing guardrails, namely dialogue, rules of conflict prevention, geopolitical restraint, and mutual military restraint and information. This concept ultimately led to the peaceful coexistence of different political systems, whose political and international law principles were agreed upon in the 1975 CSCE Helsinki Final Act. The accusation of having violated the CSCE principles is likely to continue to weigh heavily on the political willingness to resume the security dialogue within the framework of the OSCE in the future. It will depend above all on whether it is possible to end the war in Ukraine without causing lasting damage to the OSCE principles.

The key: a role in conflict management in Ukraine

That is why, in the current situation, much will depend on developments in Ukraine with regard to Switzerland's OSCE Chairpersonship in 2026. If there is movement towards a resolution of the conflict in Ukraine, this could open opportunities for the OSCE. In the short term, this could involve a role in monitoring and verifying a ceasefire. In order to counter reservations about observers from NATO countries, who are no longer accepted as impartial by one side or the other, this would probably have to take place within the framework of a joint peacekeeping operation with the United Nations. However, based on official statements, it is by no means certain that the parties to the conflict and the potential facilitator, the United States, would want to entrust such a task to multilateral organizations. Yet this would be the logical step in order to monitor ceasefire agreements and, above all, demilitarized zones in a neutral and competent manner. In informal discussions, however, experts from the key capitals have indicated that such a mandate cannot be ruled out and could well be on the table during negotiations. We have also heard from the OSCE Conflict Prevention Center that the organization is preparing for such a role and also values the work of the GCSP in this regard. It can also be assumed that the Turkish Secretary General Feridun Siniroglu is in close contact with his government and OSCE participating States on this matter.

If the OSCE were to be entrusted with another important task in the management of the conflict in Ukraine, it would inevitably receive more attention from decision-makers. This is a prerequisite for assuming further important roles in the gradual reconstruction of a European security order that is not based exclusively on confrontation and deterrence. In the short to medium term, this includes a whole range of building blocks such as the restoration of security policy dialogue formats, military risk reduction, confidence- and security-building measures, and arms control agreements. In the longer term, there also needs to be a debate on strengthening existing institutions or creating new ones for security policy dialogue and cooperation, but also, of course, on the principles of European security. There are also broader questions to consider such as what role do the new players in international security, such as China and India, play? What non-direct security measures are needed to stabilize the European security area? 

Building blocks for the short to medium term

Progress towards resolving the conflict in Ukraine will have to go hand in hand with a de-escalation in NATO-Russia relations to reduce polarization within the OSCE area and revive the organization’s role as a platform for dialogue. In this context, I would not initially look for opportunities for genuine dialogue in formal formats such as the Permanent Council or the Forum for Security Cooperation, but rather in informal forums such as the Structured Dialogue, the committees of the three dimensions, or ad hoc formats, possibly even outside the Hofburg. This could, for example, compensate for the glaring lack of dialogue between Europe and Russia. An early focus would have to be on military risk reduction measures. We are confronted with a 5,000 km long line of contact between Russia and the West, which poses a constant risk of unintended escalation. Therefore, this line needs to be actively managed through crisis communication channels and agreements on the prevention and resolution of incidents and accidents in the air, at sea, and on land.

Measures to restore military transparency should also be discussed and decided upon at an early stage. The confidence- and security-building measures laid down in the Vienna Document, which was last slightly amended in 2011, should be reintroduced and at the same time comprehensively modernized. The Vienna Document should be adapted to the geopolitical changes and technological realities of modern warfare. The classic main weapon categories should be supplemented by naval forces, rapid reaction forces, drones, deep strike capabilities, etc., so that the CSBMs once again serve the interests of all sides. In view of the now obsolete Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) and the massive rearmament in Europe, arms control on our continent must also be discussed again soon. Depending on how the conflict in Ukraine is resolved, appropriate measures could be based on elements agreed upon in the context of security guarantees. If a continental approach is too ambitious, subregional agreements could be envisaged, focusing primarily on the hotspots of the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, and the long immediate contact zone between Russia and neighboring NATO states. The OSCE could provide a suitable framework for preparatory talks and ultimately negotiations.

Discussing fundamental issues on an inclusive platform 

The time will come when we want to discuss institutional issues relating to European security cooperation. Will there be a new edition of the NATO-Russia Council? This seems rather unlikely at present, but on the other hand we know from Russia that it prefers to talk to partners who focus exclusively on hard security. Is there a new ad hoc structure that includes the US, Russia, the E-3, an EU representation, and Ukraine? Will Russia be able to establish a credible new platform in the Eurasian region that also accommodates non-traditional actors in European security? Or will the preference be to fall back on the OSCE, which would, however, need to be reformed and equipped with significantly more generous resources? This also suggests that the role of new global security actors such as China, India, and possibly other representatives of the Global South in a future European security order would have to be carefully considered and defined. There are therefore many reasons to put the question of new strategic OSCE partnerships back on the agenda.

Just as important as the institutional issues are the questions of principle. Do the states in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security area want to continue to identify with the principles of the Decalogue? It is certainly not enough for states to reaffirm their commitment to the Helsinki Principles. There must be a willingness to seriously address the dilemmas between individual principles and to agree on non-violent methods for dealing with contradictions. These include the tensions between respect for human rights and non-interference in internal affairs, the right of peoples to self-determination and territorial integrity, as well as the dilemma between the indivisibility of security and the free choice of security alliances.

Undoubtedly, many of these very fundamental questions of European security could be discussed within  an inclusive OSCE platform. However, this requires that the end of the war in Ukraine be largely in line with OSCE principles, that the OSCE be recognized once again as a relevant platform for security cooperation, and that it be mandated and revitalized to address these issues.