Near-Parity and Strategic Stability in the AI and Space Race

What prevents power from becoming domination? And what keeps strategic competition from tipping into conflict and unchecked rivalry when no higher authority can reliably restrain states?

These questions lie at the heart of international order. In a relative Hobbesian state of nature, states pursue security and national interests within an international system that lacks a universally accepted, equitable, fair and consistently enforceable authority. Competition is inevitable, but its consequences are not. The pursuit of advantage in such an anarchic and hierarchical system can generate fear, mistrust and conflict, particularly when actors believe that falling behind may threaten their survival.

The ethical challenge is therefore inseparable from the strategic one. A state may seek dominance in the name of security, yet the accumulation of unchecked power can undermine the security of others and, ultimately, the stability of the system itself. As I have argued through Symbiotic Realism, the animus dominandi (the drive for dominance) must be understood alongside the human predispositions and emotional dynamics that shape state behaviour. The objective should not be to eliminate competition, but to prevent competition from becoming domination. This challenge is increasingly visible in the evolving geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China, where competition over technological capabilities, economic influence, and strategic security is unfolding across multiple domains. The issue is not to assign blame or privilege one power’s perspective, but to consider how intensifying rivalry can be managed without allowing strategic asymmetries to generate destabilising incentives. Disruptive-Techno-Convergence (DTC) captures the accelerating convergence of disruptive technologies across domains, where advances in one field can amplify capabilities, vulnerabilities, and strategic asymmetries in others. Its significance lies in its potential to reshape geopolitical competition and the conditions for strategic stability.

Geopolitical and geo-economic near-parity offer an efficacious means of addressing this challenge. When several powers possess sufficiently comparable capabilities, unilateral action becomes more difficult and reciprocal restraint more necessary due to mutual vulnerabilities. By limiting the ability of any one actor to dominate, near-parity can also mitigate the dynamics of Thucydides’s Trap, in which fear of a rising power and anxiety over relative decline transform shifts in the balance of power into pre-emptive conflictual competition. Near-parity does not guarantee peace, but it can create conditions in which cooperation becomes a strategic necessity.

This article argues that near-parity is particularly important in artificial intelligence and outer space, where technological asymmetries could alter deterrence, intensify perceptions of vulnerability, and create incentives for pre-emptive or coercive action. In these domains, strategic stability will depend not on achieving absolute technological equality, but on preventing decisive advantages from becoming instruments of unchecked dominance and on developing reciprocal constraints that make restraint possible.

Near-Parity and the Management of Competition

Near-parity should not be confused with absolute equality or the elimination of strategic rivalry. It refers to a distributed balance of capabilities where no single state or coalition can impose its will without facing significant repercussions. This principle extends beyond military power. In economic systems, preventing excessive monopolisation can support competition, innovation, efficiency, and a more equitable distribution of opportunities. In international affairs, similarly, a relative balance of capabilities can constrain exploitation and encourage reciprocal accommodation.

The challenge is not simply to prevent dominance, but to manage insecurity (real or perceived) during shifts in the distribution of power. The animus dominandi may encourage rising actors to convert technological gains into strategic advantage, while established powers may seek to restrict that rise before their own position deteriorates. Near-parity can moderate these innate motivations and pressures by increasing the costs of unilateral action and strengthening incentives for reciprocal restraint. The Concert of Europe, established after 1815, illustrates how a balance among major powers can support stability through consultation and diplomatic coordination. Although the arrangement was imperfect and ultimately strained by changing power distributions, it helped manage competition for a period without general war among the principal European powers. Its experience suggests that near-parity is most sustainable when supported by institutions capable of adapting to shifts in relative strength.

The distribution of strategic power is also no longer shaped by states alone. Technology companies, research institutions, infrastructure providers, and other non-state actors increasingly influence access to computing capacity, data, communications networks, and satellite services. Near-parity must therefore address concentrations of critical capabilities beyond traditional military balances.

Artificial Intelligence: Avoiding Destabilising Advantage

Artificial intelligence is transforming geopolitical competition, reshaping intelligence analysis, cyber operations, cognitive security, military planning, autonomous systems, and economic productivity. Its capabilities, however, are unevenly distributed across states and institutions, creating new forms of strategic asymmetry. Technological advantage extends beyond individual models to computing infrastructure, data, semiconductor supply chains, scientific talent, deployment capacity, and the ability to integrate AI into national security systems. These capabilities can reinforce one another, creating advantages that are difficult to replicate or counter.

Such asymmetries may generate destabilising incentives. States that fear falling behind may accelerate the deployment of insufficiently tested systems. Those that perceive themselves as possessing a decisive advantage may be tempted to pursue coercive strategies or assume that technological superiority will translate into rapid and manageable gains. AI can also compress decision-making timelines, increase uncertainty over attribution, and make it harder to distinguish deliberate escalation from unintended consequences. The challenge, thus, is not to demand identical AI capabilities among states, but to prevent technological advantage from becoming a source of unilateral coercive power.

AI Near-Parity: Beyond an Arms Race

Near-parity in AI should be understood in multidimensional and transdisciplinary terms. It should include not only relevant technological capabilities, but also the capacity to assess risks, maintain resilience, verify behaviour, and respond to harmful activity. Achieving this requires investment in research and safety expertise, resilient infrastructure, independent risk assessment, and mechanisms for communicating about high-risk developments. Reciprocal crisis channels, incident-reporting procedures, safeguards against autonomous escalation, and meaningful human accountability can help prevent competition from becoming self-reinforcing. 

Disruptive-Techno-Convergence further reinforces the need for this approach, while pointing towards my concept of the Homo HURAQUS era: a potential new era shaped by the convergence of humanoid robotics, AI superintelligence, quantum intelligence, and synthetic biology, with profound implications for human agency, security, and governance. A stable technological order will require sufficient reciprocal capacity to discourage unilateral coercion while recognising that technological competition is driven not only by security concerns, but also by economic gain, status, influence, and institutional ambition. 

The Cold War offers a cautionary example of how strategic near-parity can constrain conflictual competition. US-Soviet mutual vulnerability helped create incentives to avoid direct confrontation, while arms-control arrangements sought to reduce escalation risks. This fragile stability coexisted with proxy conflicts, ideological rivalry, and the dangers of nuclear deterrence. Its broader lesson is that reciprocal vulnerability can support restraint only when accompanied by responsible behaviour, communication, institutional arrangements, and negotiated limits. 

Outer Space: Mutual Vulnerability and Strategic Restraint

Outer space presents a second domain in which near-parity can contribute to stability. Space-based systems underpin communications, navigation, Earth observation, scientific research, economic activity, and military operations. Disruption in orbit can therefore produce consequences far beyond the immediate actors involved. Uneven capabilities in space situational awareness, counterspace operations, satellite resilience, and access to orbital services may create vulnerabilities that influence strategic calculations on Earth. Advances in these capabilities can encourage fears that an opponent might disable essential systems during a crisis, potentially prompting concealment, rapid deployment, or pre-emptive action where attribution is uncertain.

The 1967 Outer Space Treaty shows how shared risks and mutual strategic constraints can facilitate, albeit imperfectly, international agreements. Its origins cannot be reduced to near-parity alone. Nevertheless, its restrictions on placing weapons of mass destruction in orbit and its principles concerning the peaceful use of celestial bodies demonstrate the continuing importance of negotiated restraint in a strategically competitive environment. Near-parity in space should therefore emphasise reciprocal resilience rather than the replication of every offensive capability. Strengthening space-domain awareness, diversifying critical satellite infrastructure, improving disruption resistance, and developing transparency and notification mechanisms can reduce uncertainty and limit incentives for escalation.

From Relative Balance to Sustainable Stability

Contemporary space security requires defensive resilience, protection of critical infrastructure, and reciprocal transparency alongside strategic capabilities. The same principle applies to AI, as near-parity is neither a guarantee of peace nor a substitute for diplomacy, international law, and effective institutions.

Symbiotic Realism’s account of the animus dominandi helps explain the drive towards dominance, while the Neuro P5 framework (power, profit, pleasure, pride, and permanency) highlights the diverse motivations that can shape the pursuit and exercise of power. These motivations suggest that sustainable near-parity cannot depend on appeals to restraint alone. It also requires rules, incentives, and safeguards that make cooperation compatible with competing strategic and institutional interests.

States will continue to compete for influence, innovation, and strategic advantage. The central challenge is to prevent such competition from becoming conflictual, thus undermining the conditions on which all depend. In an era of highly disruptive technological convergence, sustainable strategic stability will depend not on absolute dominance, but on managing asymmetries and preserving reciprocal constraints. Near-parity should be understood not as an end in itself, but as a condition through which strategic competition can remain compatible with restraint, absolute gains and non-conflictual cooperation, and the long-term collective security of humanity.