New START: To succeed, plan for failure

Sometimes, the best way to succeed is to be prepared to fail. This is particularly true in the world of diplomacy, and even more so of arms control.

Over the past year, there has been concern in the arms control community about the future of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), sometimes referred to as, if somewhat misleadingly, the last remaining arms control agreement. Such concern is understandable. Without New START’s limits, there would no longer be a legal obstacle keeping the United States and Russia from following China’s lead and dramatically increasing—their nuclear arsenals.

With New START set to expire in 2026, the options seem clear: Either both countries find a way to extend the treaty’s limits, or they should prepare for a new and ruinously expensive arms race. Given the difficulty of securing congressional approval on anything, some experts have suggested informal arrangements to preserve treaty limits on nuclear numbers. Although it would seem clearly in the interests of both New START parties—as well as China’s—to avoid unconstrained buildups of nuclear arsenals, preserving the treaty’s limits requires more than Washington’s willingness to do so. New START is bilateral, and its fate will depend at least as much on Russia’s decisions and actions as anything happening inside the Beltway. And it won’t be easy.