State Practice and Policy on the Wagner Group

Policy Brief

State Practice and Policy on the Wagner Group

By Stuart Casey-Maslen, Associate Fellow within the Global Fellowship Initiative of the GCSP and Professor at the University of Pretoria

The Wagner Group is a Russian paramilitary organisation that first came to prominence in 2014, when its personnel were involved in operations in Crimea in Ukraine. It is said to be named after the former call sign of erstwhile Russian army officer, Dmitri Utkin. Utkin, a veteran of the armed conflicts in Chechnya, was a former special forces officer and a lieutenant-colonel in the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence service.1 However, the Wagner Group has been under the influence of the Russian oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin from the outset, although until September 2022 he continued to deny any connection with the organisation.2 In early November 2022 the Group became more public with the official opening of the PMC Wagner Centre in St Petersburg.3

Since first appearing operationally in 2014, the Wagner Group has operated in a number of countries at the behest of the territorial government in question. It was present in Syria in 2015, fighting alongside pro-government forces and guarding oilfields. In 2017 the Group was invited to the Central African Republic (CAR) to guard diamond mines, and its defence of the country's capital, Bangui, in January 2021 is seen as one of its few military success stories on the African continent.4 The Group is also reported to have been operating in Sudan, protecting gold mines.5 Wagner Group fighters appeared in Libya in April 2019 when they joined the forces of General Khalifa Haftar, after he launched an attack on the United Nations (UN)-backed government in the capital, Tripoli. The conflict ended with a ceasefire in October 2020.6 In 2019 the Wagner Group sent men to fight jihadists in Cabo Delgado province in northern Mozambique,7 but it withdrew after ten of its fighters were killed, including some who were beheaded. Personnel from the Group have since been deployed to Mali.8

In April 2022 the invasion of Ukraine was said to be “straining Moscow’s foreign deployments”.9 As a consequence, a number of Wagner Group personnel were shifted from the CAR, Libya and Syria to bolster Russian forces in Ukraine. This may have occurred even before the invasion began in late February 2022.10 CAR citizens are among the Group's personnel in Ukraine.11 Commentators have speculated that if the Ukraine conflict persists, this may constrain Russia’s ability to compete further afield in security operations.12 This Policy Brief will consider the security challenges arising from the use of private military companies (PMCs) in general, and the Wagner Group in particular. It will then address the policy implications of that use, including through a review of selected states' practice and policy. As the brief explores, states have differing views as to the desirability and - indeed - legality of using PMCs. The sometimes narrow distinction between such companies and mercenaries is also described. The brief concludes with conclusions and policy recommendations.

Stuart Casey-Maslen is an Associate Fellow within the Global Fellowship Initiative of the GCSP and an Extraordinary Professor at the University of Pretoria, South Africa. He holds a doctorate in the law of armed conflict and master’s degrees in international human rights law and forensic ballistics.

Disclaimer: The views, information and opinions expressed in this publication are the author’s/authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect those of the GCSP or the members of its Foundation Council. The GCSP is not responsible for the accuracy of the information.